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Abstract* 
While it has traditionally been viewed as the mechanism for constructing a 
remarkable supranational legal order, as well as the primary indication of 
judicial support for European integration, the intensity of "dialogue" established 
by preliminary references from national courts to the European Court of Justice 
varies considerably and unexpectedly amongst member states. By focusing 
attention on what generates litigation involving EC law, the model presented 
here identifies transnational economic interaction and transnational movement 
of people as factors which account almost entirely for cross-national variation 
in reference rates. These findings are contrasted with the inability of other 
factors to account for variation, including population size, implementation of 
EC law, reception of supremacy and direct effect, judicial empowerment, legal 
education, and various aspects of national legal culture. 
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Masked by a shroud of complex legal rhetoric and shielded by claims of judicial 
impartiality, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has shaped the trajectory of 
European integration through its rulings on preliminary references (Burley and 
Mattli 1993, Weiler 1991, Rasmussen 1986). That is, of course, when it has 
had references to rule upon. That the ECJ can not compel, but rather relies on 
Member States to produce these references establishes something of a dialogue 
between national and transnational  judicial institutions. From the Court's 
perspective, the sources and patterns of preliminary references are fairly 
irrelevant--the frequency of dialogue rather than the distribution of lines 
amongst the actors determines the amount of raw material available to shape the 
integration process.' From an analytical perspective, however, the fact that the 
judicial dialogue between the ECJ and the respective Member States varies 
considerably in its intensity raises important questions about the process and 
politics of legal integration. 
This article attempts to identify a dominant variable which accounts for 
such variation. The analysis indicates that quantifiable economic factors 
explain nearly all the variation in national reference rates, a finding which 
challenges traditional arguments that references depend on non-quantifiable 
factors such as legal formalism, judicial empowerment, legal culture and the 
idiosyncrasies of individual judges. Furthermore, variance amongst national 
reference rates implies that integration is, or has the potential to be driven more 
by some states than others. The role of frequent French and German 
preliminary references in shaping early ECJ jurisprudence in accordance with 
1  As Rasmussen notes, the sheer volume of references provides "the Court's sole means of 
influence and control" (Rasmussen 1986:255). However, the distribution of references might 
concern the ECJ if national courts in certain Member States refused to apply its previous 
preliminary rulings. The binding force of an ECJ preliminary ruling, on the court which 
referred the case as well as on all other national courts throughout the Community, has been a 
matter of some controversy. Article 5 of the treaty obliges national courts to rule in 
accordance with ECJ case law, but a certain measure of uncertainty and latitude emerges from 
the Court's rulings in this matter. See Bebr 1981b, Shaw 1993:146-7. 
the national legal systems of these two states has been noted, in contrast to 
British courts which forfeited their ability to exercise influence on Community 
law by foregoing references (Dagtoglou 1978). A model of judicial dialogue 
which accounts for variation in reference rates therefore has significant 
predictive as well as explanatory value. 
After a brief review of how the existing literature deals with the question 
of reference rates, I present a preliminary model of judicial dialogue and 
establish criteria for selecting and evaluating independent variables. This is 
followed by an analysis of six quantitative variables which might explain cross-
national variation in reference rates. Based on the quantitative findings, 
additional hypotheses and areas of future research are then identified.2 
Why do reference rates vary? 
The starting point for the analysis is a central empirical conundrum of EC 
legal integration: 	why do reference rates for Member States vary so 
considerably, with national courts in Germany and some small states producing 
so many, and those in the UK and the south so few? 



























    
    
    
    
     
Figure 1 The Dependent Variable: Average Preliminary Reference Rates 
Note: Measuring the total number of references from each 
state would introduce a bias against Ireland, Denmark, the 
UK, Spain, Portugal and Greece. The average number of 
references per year avoids this problem by controlling for 
different lengths of Community membership. 
Remarkably little has been written on this subject, either by political scientists 
or EC lawyers. Rather, efforts have been focused on a separate aspect of 
judicial dialogue--explaining why and at what point national courts embraced 
doctrines of supremacy and direct effect. In particular, each of the prevailing 
models of judicial interaction between national courts and the ECJ--legalism 
and neo-functionalism--recognises the importance of 177 references as a 
defining element in the judicial dialogue, but neither offers an explicit 
explanation for cross-national variation in the intensity of this dialogue and the 
resulting variation in the patterns of references (Weiler 1991, Burley and Mattli 
1993, Golub 1996). Recent efforts to develop a theory of inter-court 
competition also fail to address cross-national variance in reference rates, 
focusing instead on why we see references from lower but not higher courts 
(Alter 1995). 
However, the assumptions embedded in the legalist and  neo-functionalist 
models generate several testable hypotheses about why reference rates vary 
(Golub 1996:363-365). One possibility drawn from legal formalism is that the 
total number of references, as well as any cross-national variation in reference 
rates, to a large extent is dictated by the receptiveness of national judges to the 
"inherent logic" of ECYs arguments (Weiler 1991, Mancini 1989). If correct, 
the rate of 177 references would be higher in states where judges were swayed 
by the legal persuasiveness of ECJ rulings regarding the need to refer, in 
particular Da Costa, CILFIT and Foto-Frost.3 Low reference rates would 
reflect instances where these rulings were deemed less persuasive by national 
judges. 
Another qualitative factor underpinning variation in reference rates has 
also been suggested by neofunctionalists, who attribute Article 177 judicial 
dialogue to the lure of professional self-interests--"heady" psychological factors 
and judicial empowerment which create unidirectional incentives driving 
national judges to provide the ECJ with preliminary references (Weiler 1994, 
Burley and Mattli 1993). Rasmussen, for example, attributes the growth of 
references during the period 1967-83 to an ECJ publicity campaign which 
fostered these feelings by bringing national judges to Luxembourg and alerting 
them to the benefits of judicial cooperation (Rasmussen 1986:246-7). 
Unfortunately, comparative studies of how these factors affect reference rates in 
each Member State have not been performed. Furthermore, important 
3 Cases 28-30/62 [1963] ECR 31, 283/81 [1982] ECR 3415 and 314/85 [1987] ECR 4199. 
These rulings establish guidelines for national judges on the obligation to refer. Da Costa 
introduced an exception to the obligation of courts of last resort to refer under Article 177(3)-- 
when the Court has already ruled on a question which was "materially identical". While 
appearing to expand this doctrine, CILFIT actually narrowed the grounds upon which national 
courts can refuse to refer by constructing the exception so narrowly "that it would rarely, if 
ever, be satisfied" (Mancini and Keeling 1991:3). See Rasmussen 1984. The ECJ held in  
Foto-Frost that even lower national courts must refer where the legal validity of Community 
acts is in question. 
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4  This view of the judicial dialogue requires substantial rethinking, as it overestimates the 
expected number of references by ignoring important disincentives, particularly the ability of 
individual judges to pursue specific policy outcomes by withholding references. Similarly, in 
some cases we might see fewer references because the heady business of engaging in judicial 
dialogue with the ECJ might be tempered by an attachment to sovereignty and a general 
aversion to the integration process on the part of national judges. 
Outside of the two leading theoretical models designed specifically to 
explain EC legal integration, differences in national legal culture are also 
obvious candidates for explaining reference rates. While the diversity of 
scholarship on legal culture tends to reveal the "catch-all quality" of the term, 
comparative legal analysis has highlighted important national variation in the 
supply and demand for law, as well as the structure and operation of legal 
institutions (Nelken  1995). Attention to such variations--including, for 
example, levels of national litigiousness, the size of national judiciaries and 
their caseloads, traditions of judicial review, dualist and monist doctrines, and 
the national diversity in the legal training of advocates--might reasonably be 
expected to explain a substantial amount about Article 177 reference rates. 
However, although patchy and incomplete, available data suggests that these 
factors do not account for cross-national variation in the frequency of 
references. 
In their study of national courts and the ECJ, Weiler and Dehousse offer 
the following conclusion: "Could the high number [of references] for some 
Member States relate to generally more litigious societies? This seems unlikely 
given the relative similarity between a group of Member States" (Weiler and 
Dehousse 1992:14). Indeed, based on Figure 1, if it were a key factor in 
variation, proponents of this variable would need to demonstrate a remarkable 
aversion to legal proceedings in Ireland, Denmark, the UK and Mediterranean 
states, much higher but similar levels of litigiousness in Italy, the Netherlands 
and Belgium, and an unusual affinity for legal confrontation in Germany. For 
Germany the argument might be made, but the Netherlands has "the lowest 
litigation frequencies on the European continent"  (Blankenburg  1994:789). The 
Netherlands also has perhaps the lowest number of advocates in Europe, as well 
as one of the smallest judiciaries  (Blankenburg  1994:793), factors which have 
not prevented it from having a remarkably high reference rate. 
disincentives have been identified which make it unlikely that judicial self-
interest or empowerment are the underlying determinants of reference rates 
(Golub 1996, Rawlings 1993).4  
While the argument is never made explicitly, the scholarship devoted to 
supremacy and direct effect might also contain potential explanations for 
variation. Theoretically, application of direct effect and supremacy could lead 
to more preliminary references as EC law becomes an available remedy in 
national courts. Alternatively, early acceptance of supremacy and direct effect 
might remove many of the ambiguities surrounding the application of EC law 
and its relationship with pre-existing national norms, leading to a paucity of 
references. However, the timing of when national courts embraced doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect apparently bears no relation to reference rates: the 
UK and Italy each embraced direct effect at an early stage (Mattli and Slaughter 
1996), but this was not associated with large or equivalent numbers of 
references from these states. Similarly, France and Britain both accepted direct 
effect and supremacy at a later stage with landmark decisions in the Conseil 
d'Etat and House of Lords, but exhibited dramatically different patterns of 
references from one another--France's reference rate was exceeded only by 
Germany while the UK remained a noticeable laggard. Nor did Italy and the 
Netherlands accept these doctrines at the same time, as their equivalent 
reference rates might suggest. Thus we do not find that reception of supremacy 
and direct effect leads either to an increase or a paucity in the number of 
references--national reference rates are apparently unrelated to the early 
application of these doctrines. 
Scholars of legal culture might also highlight national differences in the 
structure of legal education, and how these differences condition the supply of 
and demand for preliminary references. Lawyers in some states may not 
encourage references because they have little knowledge of or experience with 
European law, their legal education having consisted almost entirely of national 
law (Brown and Kennedy 1994:275, Goode 1993:11). Despite the appeal of 
this argument, very little research has been done on comparative legal 
education, and what does exist suggests that this variable enjoys minimal 
explanatory power. Evidence must be provided, for example, that lawyers in 
Belgium and the Netherlands are somehow immersed in EC legal studies, those 
in Britain severely deprived, and that education requirements differ 
significantly amongst France, Germany and Italy. Furthermore, given their 
similar reference rates, the proportion of education devoted to EC law would 
have to be roughly equivalent in Italy and the Netherlands. In fact, the 
persistent lack of British references does not reflect a lack of EC legal 
education (Brown and Kennedy 1994:275-6, Goode 1993:13). 	More 
importantly, legal requirements in all Member States are dominated by courses 
in national law, which makes it difficult to explain cross-national variation in 
reference rates. Even amongst the original states, "the basic diet is national 
law" (Lonbay 1992:81) and insufficient attention is paid to EC legal 
requirements, which form a small component of international law or are grafted 
interstitially on to other traditional courses (Brown and Kennedy 1994:275, 
Lonbay 1992:84-93, de Groot 1992). Germany is a particularly clear example 
of this phenomenon (de Groot 1992:20-22) yet it has the highest reference rate. 
Because cross-national variance in reference rates may reflect a 
combination of these domestic legal factors and other variables which is far too 
numerous and complex to model, the challenge is clearly to identify which 
factors best account for national differences. The model presented below seeks  
to do just this. If it can be shown that a single factor identified in the model 
accounts for a substantial amount of the variation, it becomes unnecessary to 
look further for explanations drawn from legal culture or the two traditional 
models of EC legal integration. 
The model 
The model presented here is designed to test two essential features of the 
reference process, the actual number of references (the dependent variable), and 
the potential demand for adjudication involving EC law (the independent 
variable). Obviously issues of EC law must first arise in national litigation 
before they are sent to the ECJ. As national judges are brought into more 
frequent contact with EC law through demand for litigation, the number of 
references should increase accordingly. Demand for litigation involving EC 
law is generated only when a treaty provision or a piece of secondary legislation 
might play an important part in a national court case. Therefore I examine 
several quantifiable independent variables which could generate cases 
involving issues of EC law, and thereby serve as the causal mechanism for 
cross-national variation in reference rates. 
In so doing, the model collapses the necessary chain of events which 
leads to a preliminary reference. It ignores the very complex, perhaps essential, 
relationship between issues arising and issues referred, and models instead the 
connection between factors. which might generate a high number of issues 
arising and the actual number of references made. While judges play an 
essential role in facilitating references, they are treated here effectively as an 
intervening factor, a conduit through which a limited number of references 
could conceivably pass depending on the underlying demand. Of course a more 
thorough model could take account of the fact that not everything is referred, 
and that the "referral propensities" of national judges vary amongst states and 
over time (Golub 1995). The implications of omitting judicial discretion as a 
crucial intervening variable should be reflected in the model's ability (or 
inability) to account for actual reference rates. 
The "perfect" independent variable, if it were to exist, would capture the 
preliminary reference rates of Member States in the equation  Y = mX. For 
example, if the number of lawyers X strongly determines the number of 177 
references Y,  then we would find the same reference/lawyer ratio (Y/X) in all 
states--doubling lawyers would double references, tripling lawyers would triple 
references etc. In this case the R-squared value which measures the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables would be exactly 1.0, as 
shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 The Perfect Independent Variable 
Independent 
	Total 177 references 
variable 
	
8x 	 8y 
7x 7y 
6x 	 6y 
5x 5y 
4x 	 4y 
3x 3y 
2x 	 2y 
X y  
Regression R-squared Value= 1.0 
While never reaching a level of perfection, variables which generate the highest 
R-squared values suggest the highest causal relationship with 177 reference 
rates. Identification of the factors which drive reference rates allows us to 
answer some of the central questions offered above: for example, why do small 
states produce so many references, Britain so few, and why does the German 
reference rate exceed those of Italy and France? As the explanatory power of 
the model's variables increases, the need to consider judicial discretion, legal 
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culture, neo-functionalism and legal formalism as determinants of reference 
rates decreases accordingly. 
Selection of variables 
Six independent variables have been selected for their potentially 
dominant effect on 177 reference rates: population size, economic openness,  
intra-EC trade value, intra-EC agricultural trade value, number of  EU non-
nationals in a host state, and EC law implementation rates as measured by the 
number of Article 169 warning letters issued against a Member State. This 
section outlines the analytical reasons behind selection of each variable, while 
the following section assesses their explanatory power through the use of 
bivariate regression. The analysis is intentionally restricted to bivariate 
regression, as several of the independent variables exhibit extremely high 
collinearity, making estimates from multiple regression extremely unstable and 
therefore unreliable.5  A distinction is also made between original and newer 
Member States in order to identify whether different variables apply more 
strongly in the UK, Ireland, Denmark and southern Europe. 
The analysis then introduces the concept of judicial learning in order to 
further explore the strength of each independent variable. The theoretical 
justification here is that a transition period should occur after accession to the 
Community, during which time familiarity with EC law by lawyers, litigants 
and judges increases (Golub 1996). Until such diffusion of experience took 
place reference rates would be artificially low, unrelated to the quantitative 
factors which determined reference rates in other Member States. 
5 In other words, several of the independent variables are closely associated, with increases in 
one corresponding to increases in the other. This precludes discerning the independent effect 










After a number of years, the rates from new Member States should 
converge with those of the original Member States, in accordance with shared 
underlying factors, reflected in higher R-squared values. Decreasing regression 
values could signal either the relevance of other quantitative variables, or the 
importance of qualitative factors and other pathologies suggested by both 
neofunctionalists and previous studies of judicial discretion (Burley and Mattli 
1993, Golub 1995, 1996). In order to test for judicial learning and reveal the 
actual predictive power of each variable, the assessment therefore factors in a 
timelag for Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Greece, Spain and Portugal by omitting 
data for their initial years of membership and then recalculating the regressions. 
Population size:  Larger populations generally produce more courts, more 
businesses, more litigation, more possibility of encountering issues of EC law, 
and therefore more references. EC lawyers have suggested that, after some 
initial difficulties, every Member State began to make frequent use of Article 
177 (Bebr 1981a:543, Volcansek 1986261), so that over time 177 reference 
rates might be nothing more than a function of population size. This would 
explain why Germany, the largest state, has the highest rate of references, while 
the smallest states Portugal and Ireland have the lowest. Below, average 
national population size is regressed against average reference rates for the 
years 1972-94.6 
Openness of the economy:  Another possibility is that references are highly 
associated with identifiable economic factors which give rise to litigation 
involving EC law, and which vary across states. As a starting point one such 
factor would be the density of  intra-EC transnational  economic interaction. 
This would include the number of firms involved in cross-border trade, and also 
6 Data is drawn from European Economy. 
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the frequency of trade. Firms operating transnationally necessarily encounter 
foreign legal regulations which place restrictions on their business activities. 
This creates a demand for litigation in national courts and for references to the 
ECJ in order to receive guidance on treaty provisions and secondary community 
law, both of which are designed to remove such restrictions. 
Large corporations doing business throughout Europe have strong 
incentives to support completion of the common market, and have consistently 
pursued this goal through litigation in which the ECJ was encouraged to assess 
the validity of national measures through frequent preliminary rulings (Mattli 
and Slaughter 1996, Plötner 1995,  Claes  and De Witte 1995). While a large 
proportion of the preliminary references made during the period 1988-93 dealt 
with trade related issues such as commercial policy, company law, free 
movement of goods, taxation and competition (Brown and Kennedy 1994:416-
17), the national distribution of these cases has yet to be accounted for. One 
goal of this article is thus to identify specific aspects of national trade which 
determine patterns of cross-national variation in reference rates, for the entire 
period 1972-1994. 
One indication of intra-EC economic interaction could be the openness of 
the economy for each Member State, traditionally measured by the percentage 
of GDP derived from trade. Courts in states which derive a high proportion of 
their GDP from infra-EC trade would be expected to face greater pressure for 
application of EC law from importers and exporters, which in turn would 
produce relatively more references. As Mattli and Slaughter point out, "it is no 
coincidence that ten out of the first thirteen references to the ECJ came from 
Dutch courts," as small states have particularly open economies (Mattli and 
Slaughter 1996:8). The analysis presented below utilises the overall openness 
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of national economies, but also differentiates between exports and imports for 
the period 1972-94.7 
Intra-EC trade: A crude proxy for the density of economic interactions could be 
the actual value of intra-EC trade for each state: the sum of  intra-EC imports 
plus intra-EC exports. This reflects the number of cross-border shipments and 
the number of firms operating at a  transnational  level, and might account for the 
absolute number of references. Small states have high rates of cross-border 
trade, which might account for their disproportionate number of references. As 
with economic openness, the analysis differentiates between  intra-EC exports 
and imports for 1972-94 in order to identify the potentially dominant factor 
driving reference rates.b 
We would expect states with large  intra-EC trade to have large numbers 
of instances where firms encounter foreign practices which could violate EC 
law, such as cases involving EC law on competition and undertakings (Articles 
85-90), monopolies (Article 37), customs duties (Articles 12-17), state aids 
(Articles 92-94), dumping (Article 91), taxation of goods (Articles 95-99), free 
movement of goods (Article 9, Articles 30-36) etc. These encounters should 
produce demand for litigation in national courts regarding questions of 
interpretation, and therefore references to the ECJ. For states with low rates of  
intra-EC trade, firms face potential restrictions on their business activity mostly 
as matters of national law. Without  transnational  trade effects, there is less 
prospect of encountering the treaty or secondary legislation, and thus less 
demand for references to the ECJ. 
7 Data compiled from European Economv . 
8 Data from European Economy. Not considered in this paper is the possibility that extra-EC 
trade flows might also influence reference rates, if EC laws on external tariffs and customs 
were involved. More refined versions of the model could include this variable. 
Agricultural trade: 	Intra-EC agricultural trade is a specific form of  
transnational  economic interaction, and is calculated separately from (not 
subsumed by) general  intra-EC trade. States with large  intra-EC agricultural 
trade should encounter more conflicts between national rules and EC law 
(Articles 38-47) and thus demand greater numbers of references. Almost a fifth 
of the preliminary references made during 1988-93 dealt with agriculture 
(Brown and Kennedy 1994:416-17), making this a potentially fundamental 
determinant of national reference rates. Unfortunately a lack of data allows 
analysis of a thirteen year time series 1980-92, as opposed to 23 years for 
general trade.9 
Foreign population: Besides trade flows, the number of  EU non-national 
residents in a state (e.g--Germans living in France, Italians living in Belgium) 
might exercise a strong influence over patterns of preliminary references. 
Rather than transnational  economic interaction,  transnational  movement of 
people inevitably generates conflicts between national laws, and between 
national and EC law, each of which requires ECJ resolution. High numbers of  
EU  non-nationals would be associated with frequent instances of EC law, and 
thus frequent references, in national litigation dealing with free movement of 
people (Article 48), social security for migrants (Article 51), establishment 
(Articles 52-58), freedom to provide services (Articles 59-66), and equal 
treatment (Article 7), areas which saw substantial numbers of references during 
1988-93 (Brown and Kennedy 1994:416-17). 177 cases would originate in the 
host country, rather than the country of emigration. References could deal 
directly with interpretation of the treaty itself, as in the case of free movement, 
or with the validity and interpretation of secondary legislation, as in the case of 
social security for migrant workers (Brown and Kennedy 1994:197). We would 
9  Data from UN Commodity Trade Statistics and Eurostat. 
I 
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therefore expect high numbers of  EU  non-national residents to translate into a 
high reference rate. Unfortunately a significant amount of data is missing for 
this variable, which limits the time period under consideration. Available data 
from 1980-93 is used in the regression analysis. 10  
Implementation failure: The demand for ECJ involvement in national litigation 
might also depend on how governments have implemented EC law. States with 
poor implementation create situations where lawyers can easily question the 
conformity of national measures with EC secondary legislation. Identifying 
implementation failure for EC law presents a number of definitional problems, 
but is measured here by the number of Article 169 warning letters issues against 
a state. We would expect a high number of warning letters to correspond with a 
high number of references. I introduce this variable in order to capture 1,77 
references dealing primarily with secondary legislation (conformity of national 
implementing measures, or lack thereof, with EC law), although warning letters 
are also issued for direct violations of treaty provisions (e.g. Article 30). Data 
for this variable is available only for 1978-94.11 
Results 
Reference rates were regressed against the independent variables, Figure 3 
reports the R-squared values. Calculations were made based on reference rates 
of the original Member States (except Luxembourg) (n=5), the original states 
plus Denmark, Ireland and the UK (n=8), and all states after the accession of 
Greece, Spain and Portugal (n=11). 
10 Data from OECD Trends in International Migration 
and Eurostat. 
11 Taken from Annual Reports of the Commission to the European Parliament on 
the 
Application and Monitoring of EC Law. 
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Figure 3: Article 177 Reference Rate Bivariate Regression Results 
N=11 I N=8 f N=5  
Trade 
intra-EC imports 0.83226 0.83106 0.92525 
(6.68) (5.433) (6.094)  intra-EC exports 0.93785 0.9415 0.99842 
(11.65) (9.827) (43.576) total intra-EC trade 0.89818 0.90056 0.98493 
(8.91) (7.372) (14.003) 
import openness 0.06626 0.10692 0.25838 
(-.7991) (-.8475) (-1.022) 
export openness 0.00111 0.05741 0.21801 
(-.100) (-.6045) (-.9145) 
total openness 0.01988 0.07976 0.23946 
(-.427) (-.721) (-.972)  
Agriculture 
intra-EC agriculture imports 0.81341 0.75398 0.74779 
(6.264) (4.288) (2.982)  
intra-EC agriculture exports 0.48379 0.34164 0.01795 
(2.904) (1.765) (.234) 
total intra-EC agriculture trade 0.82074 0.78141 0.52563 
(6.419) (4.631) (1.823) 
Implementation 0.00398 0.13914 0.10878 
(-.190) (.985) (-.605)  
EU Foreign Residents 0.68772 0.61143 0.65702 
(4.452) (3.073) (2.397) 
National Population 0.43453 0.41643 0.39166 
111- 
(2.63) (2.069) (1.39) 
. T-statistics in parentheses 
The regression values are consistent with the hypothesis that preliminary 
reference rates are determined by quantifiable domestic factors.  Intra-EC trade, 
particularly exports, exhibits a remarkably strong relationship with reference 
rates in all eleven Member States (R-squared=.93785). 	This striking 
relationship is shown in Figure 4--an increase of 2.8 billion ECU in  intra-EC 
exports is associated with one additional preliminary reference. A second 
variable, agricultural trade, also shows a strong relationship with references, but 
only in the case of imports (R-squared=.81341). Contrary to expectations, 
agricultural exports are only weakly related to reference rates. Although not as 
strong as that with trade, the relationship between references and the number of  
EU  foreign residents appears significant, consistent with the model's 
17 
predictions. 1 '- An equally important finding is that two of the potentially 
influential variables--implementation of EC law and overall economic 
openness--appear to play no role at all in determining cross-national variation in 
reference rates (R-squared values=.00398 and .01988 respectively). 
12 In assessing the role of these variables, the collinearity caveat must be taken into 
consideration. Although not exhibiting quite as strong a relationship, the picture would be 
similar if plotting references against imports, agricultural imports or EU foreign residents. 
While this makes it impossible to determine whether agricultural imports, with the second 
highest R-squared value, exhibit a strong relationship with references independent of overall 
national trade levels, the scatter plot (not included here) casts doubt on the explanatory power 
of this variable. Unlike the case of exports, where deviation from an almost perfect linear 
relationship depended on the peculiarities of only three states, agricultural imports appear 
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Figure 5: 177 Reference Bivariate Regression Results Including Time Lag 
Reducing the sample size reveals that exports exert an even more dominant 
influence on reference rates in the original Member States. Removal of the 
newer states leaves the original states falling almost exactly along the best-fit 
line, the R-squared value rising to .998 (n=5) as indicated in Figure 3. The 
analysis also identifies the UK, Spain and Greece as outlier states where a 
weaker relationship exists between exports and references. Spain and the UK 
produce fewer references than expected given their level of  intra-EC exports 
(falling below the best-fit line), while Greece produces a disproportionately 
high number of references (falling well above the line). This could indicate the 
role of other quantitative factors not considered here, but equally supports the 
conclusion that in these states judicial discretion, psychological qualitative 
factors, legal culture and other variables play an important role in determining 
the use of Article 177, with disincentives significantly depressing the British 
reference rate (Golub 1995, 1996).13 
Introducing the concept of judicial learning also helps identify causal 
factors underpinning cross-national variation in reference rates. Over time, as 
new states adjust to EC law and experience learning, R-squared values should 
increase for the relevant independent variables and outliers should move closer 
and closer to the best-fit line. Alternatively, the R-squared value could fall 
precipitously if trade played no role in determining reference rates in the newer 
states. Figure 5 reports the regression analysis after factoring in a time lag. 
Regressions were performed on limited periods of data: 1983-94 for Ireland, 
Denmark and the UK, 1986-94 for Spain and Portugal, 1986-94 for Greece. 
The full 1972-94 time period was used for original Member States. 
13 It should be noted that any conclusions drawn about the behaviour of the smallest states 
should be treated with caution given the inherent problems of working with small numbers--
the references/exports ratios for these states are highly sensitive to tiny changes in the actual 
number of references, a few additional cases could alter the results dramatically. 
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n=8  Trade 
intra-EC imports .71827 0.83226 .6824 0.83106 
(4.79) (6.68) (3.5902) (5.433)  intra-EC exports .88961 0.93785 .87648 0.9415 
(8.516) (11.65) (6.5249) (9.827) total intra-EC trade .81953 0.89818 .7939 0.90056 
(6.393) (8.91) (4.807) (7.372) import openness .1114 0.06626 .1353 0.10692 
(-1.062) (-.7991) (-.969) (-.8475) export openness .01779 0.00111 .1291 0.05741 
(-.40377) (-.100) (-.9431) (-.6045) 
total openness .05272 0.01988 .13358 0.07976 
(-.7077) (-.427) (-.9618) (-.721)  
Agriculture 
intra-EC agriculture imports .8581 0.81341 .8178 0.75398  









(2.7245) (2.904) (1.655) (1.765) total intra-EC agriculture trade .8287 0.82074 .7955 0.78141 
(6.599) (6.419) (4.831) (4.631) 
Implementation .1522 0.00398 .0283 0.13914 
(-1.271) (-.190) (.4182) (.985)  
EU Foreign Residents .7420 0.68772 .6789 0.61143 
(5.0879) (4.452) (3.562) (3.073) 
National Population .5134 0.43453 .4944 0.41643 
11-.-. 
(3.082) (2.63) (2.422) (2.069) 
. T-statistics in parentheses 
Clearly exports exhibit a strong relationship with reference rates even after a 
transition period, as R-squared remains very high for the case of n=11. 
Nevertheless, there is a slight weakening from the nearly perfect .998 we saw 
for the original states. This could indicate the importance of alternative 
quantitative factors or the role of qualitative factors and other variables in a few 
states. Figure 6 reveals which states have undergone an adjustment during the 
transition period, whereby their reference rates approach an expected value 
based on trade, or continue to exert downward pressure on the R-squared value. 
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The graph provides support for the presence of judicial learning, but only in 
Spain, where after a four year time lag the relationship between references and 
exports approximated that found throughout the EC--an additional reference for 
each 3.0 billion ECU increment in intra-EC exports. The level of references 
from Greece, on the other hand, remained unusually high instead of decreasing 
in line with its intra-EC exports, although the small numbers problem must be 
taken into consideration. Already very close to the best-fit line, Portugal, 
Ireland and Denmark experienced almost no change during the transition 
period, suggesting that judicial learning was not necessary to bring their 
reference rates into accordance with trade factors, but also that membership did 
not trigger pathologies undermining this relationship. The data also confirm 
previous characterisations of the UK as a severe laggard when it comes to 
preliminary references (Golub 1995, 1996). The UK actually moved farther 
away from the best-fit line, revealing the fact that according to this variable a 
period of "learning" merely exacerbated Britain's anachronistic position--
removing the UK from Figure 6 raises the R-squared value from .8896 to .9731. 
Conclusions 
A number of conclusions emerge from the previous analysis. As 
predicted by the model, transnational economic interaction, as well as  
transnational movement of people constitute the underlying determinants of 
national reference rates. Quantifiable variables such as intra-EC trade, intra-EC 
agricultural trade and EU foreign residents explain cross-national variation in 
patterns of judicial interaction between the ECJ and the Member States. The 
level of intra-EC exports displays the most remarkable association with 
references, particularly in the original Member States. It also appears that in 
some cases accession triggers a process of judicial learning, whereby over time 
the reference-trade relationship also applies to the newer Member States. Also 
of great significance, other quantitative factors which might have been 
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important for determining reference rates, such as population size, the openness 
of the national economy, and the level of implementation of - EC laws can be 
excluded as insignificant pending further analysis. 
These findings leave little room for claims that reference rates are 
determined even moderately by factors such as "the goodwill of national courts" 
(Mancini and Keeling 1991:t), national reception of direct effect and 
supremacy, judicial empowerment, legal formalism,  neo-functionalist dynamics 
between the ECJ and national courts, legal culture, traditions of judicial review, 
monist v.  dualist doctrines, or upon distinct idiosyncrasies of national 
judiciaries. The high rates found in Belgium and the Netherlands, for instance, 
appear to depend on trade rather than an unusual willingness of Belgian and 
Dutch judges to follow the narrow legal guidelines laid out in CILFIT. 
Similarly, the variation between German, French and Italian rates seems to 
reflect export patterns, not differing intensities amongst national judiciaries of 
heady enthusiasm for European integration or reverence for members of the 
ECJ. The German reference rate is the highest in the EC, nearly twice that of 
France, not because Germany has the most open economy or because of its 
unique legal culture, but because it produces a vast amount of exports. Most of 
the smaller Member States follow a similar pattern, exporting little and 
producing few references. 
Intuitively we might have expected a bewildering number of domestic 
factors to underpin variation. However, the robustness of the results suggests 
that factors such as legal culture or functionalism operate only at the margin for 
most states. Significant effects might even be limited to two cases, Greece and 
UK, where qualitative factors contribute to an unusually high number of 
references in the former and a particularly low number in the latter. 
Nevertheless, if for most states patterns of references are strongly associated 
24 
with quantifiable factors such as trade, this allows more leverage in identifying 
and studying anachronisms. 
Evidence that quantifiable economic factors dictate patterns of 
preliminary references places the burden of proof on those who would claim 
that structural and cultural aspects of comparative legal studies account for 
variation in national patterns of references. If these factors operate at all, 
tireless pursuit of their effects might only inject unnecessary complexity into a 
system that can be adequately modelled by more parsimonious means. While 
there is no doubt that quantitative factors require a significant amount of testing 
and refinement before it is possible to decide definitively on their causal 
relationship with reference rates, it is equally important that claims for the 
determining influence of qualitative factors generate testable hypotheses which 
are then subjected to the same rigorous analysis. 
Refinement of the model is certainly required. As stated at the outset, it 
will be necessary to consider the relationship between questions of EC law 
arising in national courts and the number of references made, a link in the chain 
of events which was intentionally omitted for this study. While neglect of 
judicial discretion as a variable might strike some as patently absurd, the near 
perfect connection between trade and references suggests that judges in fact 
serve as conduits, their individual discretion playing an insignificant role in 
determining aggregate national reference rates. In terms of extending the 
model, or indeed testing the preliminary results presented here, particular 
attention might be focused on explaining cross-national variation in the 
distribution of references across policy sectors once we  disaggregate overall 
reference rates.14  This requires information about the  break-down of 177 
4 The model also allows predictions about which national courts make references. We would 
expect that courts which handled issues of  transnational trade and treatment of foreign  EU 
nationals would account for the overwhelming majority of total references. 
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references by policy area, data which is not publicly available. If in fact 
quantifiable factors dictate reference rates, as the above results suggest, this 
would give rise to three additional hypotheses about patterns of references: 
-We would expect to find a predominance of trade-related 
references from all Member States. This would still allow for 
considerable cross-national variation, as trade issues could 
encompass, among other things, customs and tariff issues, free 
movement of goods, competition, and dumping, but each state 
would produce a predictable number of references in the sector 
when taken as a whole. Given the high collinearity between trade 
and agricultural trade, it is also possible that reference rates in 
certain states would show a stronger relationship with the latter 
than the former, although, unlike overall trade, the data suggests 
the relevance of agricultural imports, not exports. 
-We would expect that the number of  EU  foreigner residents, which 
also varies closely with trade, could explain cross-national 
variation in patterns of references dealing with free movement of 
persons, equality of treatment, social security, and right of 
establishment. As with trade, we might see some variation across 
states amongst these three sub-categories, but the sum of the 
subcategories would remain predictable based on the predictive 
power of our independent variable. Disentangling the independent 
effects of trade, agriculture and foreign residents on reference rates 
will require additional data in order to overcome collinearity 
problems and facilitate reliable multiple regression analysis. 
-We would expect this cross-national clustering effect around trade 
issues to contrast sharply with reference rates in sectors unrelated 
to trade, such as sex discrimination (Article 119), social policy, 
environmental protection etc. In all of these sectors the pattern of 
references from each Member State would remain highly 
unpredictable. 
Finally, this study highlights an important conceptual ambiguity 
surrounding the term "judicial dialogue" as it is currently used in the study of 
European legal integration. For many, legal integration involves "the 
acceptance of [ECJ] jurisprudence within national legal systems" (Alter 
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1995:2), particularly the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, which 
requires the cooperation of national courts. This cooperation comes in two 
distinct forms, each of which have been referred to as dialogue. On one hand, 
the frequency of preliminary references from national courts has been 
interpreted as a key indicator of cooperation with the ECJ (Golub 1996:362-
363), and thus a critical aspect of judicial dialogue. On the other hand, the term 
dialogue has been used to describe the process whereby national courts 
cooperate in European integration by applying supremacy and direct effect 
themselves, without needing to refer. 
The two issues are frequently conflated, but require separate treatment. 
Focusing on how national courts think and speak about supremacy and direct 
effect, while important for understanding legal integration, provides insufficient 
explanations for patterns of preliminary references (Golub 1995, 1996). 
Focusing on the references themselves, however, offers limited insight into the 
full implications of EC law, particularly the opportunities it affords to 
individual litigants when questioning the legality of national policies and 
governmental practices. In order to combine the work of those who study 
supremacy and direct effect with those who study preliminary references, 
scholars should clearly recognise the existence of these two separate aspects of 
judicial dialogue, the one dealing with the frequency of contact between courts, 
the other with the content and effects of the judicial conversation. The 
challenge to a comprehensive model of EC legal integration remains to assess 
both, but also to find an analytical connection between the two. 
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